Abstract: This paper tries to make plausible the following claims: The paragraphs §608 -612o fOn Certainty do not speak in favour of what Boghossian construes as the Master Argument for Relativism; that On Certainty introduces various relativistic themes; and thatBoghossian and Wittgenstein conceptualize epistemic systems in rather different ways that lead to very different views on three candidate cases for radical differencei ne pistemic systems.
On Certainty and Relativismo fD istance
Boghossians ees On Certainty §608 -12 as gesturing towardsM AR (Boghossian 2006,69, 78 -79,95) . Before looking at §608 -12 directlyIwant to brieflyexplain what Itake to be an important relativistic strand of the book. This strand is its attempt catalogue our -primarily Wittgenstein'so wn -responses to people who (seem to) denyone of our,orh is, certainties. The point of the exercise is to emphasise the variety of our responses to such denials. Some such responses are dismissive,s ome educational, some sceptical, some relativist.T here are about thirty of such scenarios in On Certainty.
Hereare some examples. When afriend deniesacertainty then Wittgenstein is inclined to regardhim as "demented" or "insane" (OC §71). Wittgenstein treats other adultmembers of his own culturesimilarly(OC §271,257). Children receive am orec haritable treatment.I nt heir case Wittgenstein is willingt oo ffer arguments, explanations, and education (OC § 310, 3 22) . Turning to the categories of strangers thatare not members of our culture, Wittgenstein thinks that sometimes we are willing to dismiss them as ignorant.Thusthe tribesmen who in 1950 insist thats omeone has been to the Moon -and who thereby denyo ne of our fundamental empirical-scientific beliefs -are "people who do not know al ot that we know" (OC §286). But other paragraphs suggest that this response is natural onlyaslong as we treat the claim "someonehas been to the moon" as adirect denial of one of our scientific certainties. Thus §92considers aking who has been told since childhood that "the earth has onlye xisted […]s ince his own birth." Wittgenstein likens the king'sbelief to magical beliefs about one'sability to make rain. This suggestst oE lizabeth Anscombe that the king is best thought of as ar eligious leader like the Dalai Lama (see Anscombe 1976 ). Wittgenstein imagines George EdwardMoore trying to convince the king that the earth has existed since long before our birth. And he goes on: "Idonot saythat Moorecould not convert the king to his view,but it would be ac onversion of as pecial kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in adifferent way." What is striking here is the absenceo fa ny "they are wrong and we know it" (OC §286). In a related passage( OC §238) Wittgenstein insists that sometimes, when someone contradicts "my fundamental attitudes" Ic an do no better than "put up with it".A nd in §108 Wittgenstein speakso fp eople who claim to have been to the moon: "We should feelo urselvesi ntellectuallyv ery distant from them."
Having convinced himself thatt his is indeedt he proper response to certain disagreements concerning magic and religion, Wittgenstein then drawsa na nalogyb etween the disagreements between believers and nonbelievers on the one hand, and our responset op ast periods with their different conceptions of the reasonable and the unreasonable, on the other hand: "But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters.A tc ertain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice versa." (OC § 336) This suggests that Wittgenstein assumes that our response to disagreements over some other certainties toom ight be treated on the model of the religious certainties.
Ip ropose calling the relativistic theme thate mergesi nt hese passages "relativism of distance";at ermc oined by Bernard Williams in ad ifferent context (see Williams 1981) . Ar elativism of distance has two key elements. On the one hand, we have a "confrontation" of epistemic or moral systems thatis"notional" rather than "real".Aconfrontation is notional if goingo vert ot he other sidei s not a "real",al iveo ption; it demands ac onversion. On the other hand, "for a reflective person the question of appraisal does not genuinely arise … in purely notional confrontation".H er terms of appraisal appear to her inappropriate or without tractionr egarding the beliefs and actions of members of the other culture.
Relativism of distance can be enriched with an idea central in the work of another relativist moral philosopher,D avid Wong.Hesuggests that ar elativistic attitude is triggered by "moral ambivalence" (Wong2006). This is an experience of an encounter in which "our sense of the unique rightness of our own judgment gets destabilized".W ee ncounter someone too much of an intellectual peer to be dismissed as insane or foolish, and yeta cting or judging in aw ay that makes us suspect or realize that our sense of right and wrongisnot uniquely correct.
There are thus three features that set Wittgensteinian "relativism of distance" apart from other versions of relativism. First,i tf ocuses on specific experiences triggering relativistic reactions.Second, it centers on conceptual difficulties of appraisal. And third, it has a "particularist" orientation: it can applyt o much smaller units than whole cultures or epistemic or moral systems.
3O nC ertainty §602 -612
We can now return to the question how these paragraphs stand vis-à-vis relativism. They belong to atrain of thought thatbegins in §602. §602states the problem to be discussed: thereissomething about our trust in physics that seems to undermine its objectivec haracter. §603 points out that physical knowledge is systematic,a nd that my knowledge of it is merely partial,overwhelmingly testimonial,and largely basedonblind trust. §604 reminds us of two things. First,the trust in physics is embeddeda nd enforced by important social institutions like the law. Second, someone who is not ac redentialed physicist is unable to challengethe results of physics. §605 expresses aworry relating to the idea that our relianceonphysics is grounded in blind trust:what if the physicists' statements were "superstition"?W ouldwebeable to detect this? §606 rejects this worry.Ordeal by fire was ab ad epistemic tool, though people did not realize this at the time. This is no reason for suspecting thatp hysical methods might likewiseb e bad. §607 lets aj udge emphasize apoint that Wittgenstein himself wantst oi nsist on: thatthe blindnessofthe trust underlying physics does not make physical knowledge impossible.
§608 restates the concern: does the blind trust rob me of the rationale to rely on physics?And the reassuring answer is that we treat the propositions of physics as "good grounds" almostbydefinition. This thought is followed, in §609,by aq uestion that structures the rest of the discussion: how do we who trust in physics react to people who put their trust in oracles instead?T he initial reply is thatw ec all "them"" primitive" and "wrong".T hese evaluations are forms of "combat" based on our language-game. In §610 Wittgenstein raises the question whether this combattingi sr ight.L eaving this question open, he notes that our casefor superiority is based on "slogans".The important implication is that we have gotn othing better. §611a dds to this that the clash between the oraclefollowing tribe and us is aclash of two irreconcilable principles, and that invectivesl ike "fool" or "heretic" are markers of such conflicts. It seems that instead of convincing the other side, all we can do is dismiss it. §612c onfirms the suspicion of §611:s ome reason-giving is possible but in the end there is onlyc ombat,p ersuasion and conversion. §602 to 612donot arguethatthe oracle is as reliable as is ours physics. But nor do they seek to establish that we invariablyf ail in justifying our epistemic systems, and that hence there are no absolute epistemic facts. The ideas hinted at in these paragraphs part and parcel of an investigation into the foundation of the (ultimatelyb lind) trust upon which science is based. That science is so based, is as hortcomingo nlyi nt he eyes of someone who has mistakene xcessively rationalist standards.
Moreover,one of the upshots of these paragraphs is that our aggression towards the oracle-users tells us something about the strength of our socially-sanctioned trust in our experts. And part of our aggression mays pring from the fact that in the encounter with the oracle-users we might be realising the role of blind trust in our belief system for the first time.But that our belief system is basedin blind trust,i sn ot an argument for relativism -not even for ar elativism of distance. On the contrary,Wittgenstein wants to remind us of how naturalitisfor us to reject thosew ho denyo ur scientificc ertainties in as ystematic way.
§602 -612t hus are as ketch of an analysis of our naturala ntirelativism (in certain domains) and its social and social-psychological foundations. Andt he messageisnot what Boghossianformulates as MAR.Wittgenstein would not accept steps 2a nd 4. He does not think thatw ehavet od efend our epistemic system when we encounter another; for him there is no such demand. There is only the natural attitude of dismissing challenges to our science.A nd concerning "No-Self-Certification" Wittgenstein would remark that we simply use our epistemic system when it comes to the purposes of combatting,p ersuading and converting.
And yet, while Id enyt hatW ittgenstein offers §602 -612a saMaster Argument for epistemic relativism, Is till think that the epistemic relativist is able to use §602 -612i nd efence of ar elativist position. Letm ee xplain. Peter Strawson once suggested that "[a]ccording to Hume […]s ceptical doubts are […] powerless against the forceofnature, of our naturallyimplanted disposition to belief" (Strawson 1985, 19) . Strawson went on to observe "ap rofound community" on this point between Wittgenstein and Hume. Michael Williams later objected that on this reading,Wittgenstein and Hume would "concede […]t he sceptic'st heoretical invulnerability" (Williams 1988, 416) . It mayb ei mpossible to live scepticism, but it mays till be right.
The central issue before us is not scepticism, but relativism. We sawt hat §602 -612s uggest that between us and ar elativism about the resultso fc urrent science stands our ultimatelyblind trust in our scientists. This trust makes it difficult for us to live such ar elativism. This is analogous to Strawson'sr eadingof Wittgenstein on scepticism. And now the relativist can argueinparallel with Michael Williams: it maywell be true that we cannot live this kind of relativism, but this consideration leavest he relativist'sp osition theoretically invulnerable. Relativism about our currentlyb est science is impossible to live -but it has not been defeated as at heoretical outlook of, say, the anthropologist or sociologist of knowledge.O nce more,W ittgenstein does not reason in this way -but we could.
How does my interpretationof §602-612relatetorelativism of distance? It is af act about us thatw ef eel epistemic or moral ambivalence in some cases and not in others. We do not feel epistemic ambivalenceabout the best current physics when we meet the tribe who trusts oracles. But some of us feel such ambivalence when we encounter,s ay,the religious beliefs of intellectual peers.
4B lindE ntitlement
Boghossiand oes not onlyt ake Wittgenstein to gesture towards MAR in §608 -612; he alsoh olds that elsewherei nW ittgenstein'so euvre we find an idea that blocks MAR from going through. This idea Boghossian calls "Blind Entitlement": "each thinker is entitled to use the epistemic system he finds himself with, without first having to supplya na ntecedentj ustification for the claim that it is the correct system" (Boghossian 2006,99) . The inspiration for this principle in §219 of the Philosophical Investigations: "When Iobey ar ule, Idon ot choose. Iobey the rule blindly." (PI §219) Blind Entitlement disables MAR in cooperation with two other principles, "Coherence" and "Demand for Impressiveness": (Coherence) AnyE St hat fails constraints of coherence is incorrect. (Demand of Impressiveness) Fora na lternative ES to triggerD emand for Justification, its "actual achievements […]h avet ob eimpressive enough to makeu sl egitimatelyd oubt the correctness of our own [epistemic system]." (Boghossian 2006,101) Coherenceradicallyrestricts the number of genuine alternativestoour epistemic system. Blind Entitlement together with Demand for Impressiveness dislodges the Demand for Justification. And Blind Entitlement contradicts No-Self-Certification.
Ia mn ot convinced thatt his is in the spirit of Wittgenstein'sp osition. Note, first of all, thathis remark about obeying arule blindlyisnot aremark about an entitlement. It is an observation about what we do. Second, while On Certainty too frequentlyspeaks about systems of beliefs,itdoes not couch our relationship to such systems in terms of entitlements. Instead Wittgenstein speaks of this relationship as "something animal" (OC §359) or "trust" (OC §509). Third, it seems to me thatW ittgenstein would be likelyt or egard Blind Entitlementa sn om ore than a "slogan" that we use to sublimate our gutresponse. And fourth, Wittgenstein would also object to the all too narrow rangeofoutcomes thatBoghossian allows for the encounter between two epistemic systems. To wit,that either one of the twoi sj udgeds uperior to the other,o re lse thatt hey are taken to equal, and equivalent to one another.
More generally, Wittgenstein would also object to the ways in which Boghossian renders the relativist and the anti-relativist positions. ForW ittgenstein, the best waytomake some forms of relativism plausible would not be an in-principle argument like MAR.Abetter routew ould be to focus on our responses to certain types of encounters. Perhaps we can capturet he difference by distinguishing between "generalist" and "particularist" versions of relativism. The generalist wants an in-principle argument as to whyawhole domaino fj udgments has to be understood in relativist terms.The particularist insists thatw e have relative intuitions about quite specific questions within domains. If the Wittgenstein of On Certainty is ar elativist,h es urelyi sar elativist of the latter sort.
5E pistemic Systems
ForB oghossian an epistemic system consists of epistemic principles. Some of these are fundamental, some are derived (Boghossian2 006,6 7). "Observation" is fundamental: "Fora ny observational proposition p, if it visually seems to S that pa nd circumstantial conditions Do btain, then Si sp rima facie justified in believing p." (Boghossian 2006,6 4) The distinction allows Boghossiant o specify ac riterion for being a "genuine alternative to our epistemic system". The criterion is that the alternative must be different in at least one fundamental principle. Boghossian argues that acouple of often-cited examples of such alternatives -the Azandeand Cardinal Bellarmine -do not in fact meet his criterion.
Wittgenstein too talks about epistemic systems of sorts (OC §105,1 08, 144, 410, 411). Beliefs in our belief systems are more or less fundamental. The more fundamental they are, the less likelyi ti st hat they are wrong. The most fundamental beliefs are certainties. The key idea is that some "sentences (or beliefs) of the form of empirical judgments(or beliefs)" can in some contextsbea sfundamental as are judgmentsorbeliefs about the meanings of words, or mathematical beliefs. And not all beliefs about the meaning of words or mathematical propositions are as certain as are "sentences of the form of empirical judgments".F urthermore, thereisstructuralreason whycertainties cannot be proven true: "My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that Icould produce in evidence for it.That is whyIam not in aposition to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it." (OC §250) Finally, Wittgensteinian epistemic systems are dynamic, they changeo vert ime (OC §96,9 9). This dynamic aspect is missing in Boghossian'sw ork. Note alsot hatw hereas Boghossian's principles are an analyst'si dealizations, abstract,a nd separable from specific contents and contexts, Wittgenstein'sc ertainties are actor'sp aradigms,concrete and inseparable from specific contents and contexts. Finally, otherthanBoghossian, Wittgenstein does not offer acriterion for what constitutes ag enuine alternative epistemic system. We can see what differencet hese differencesm ake when we turn to the examples discussed by Boghossian.
The first example is the epistemic system of Robert Bellarmine, Galileo'sopponent,and defender of ageocentric universe. AccordingtoBoghossian, Bellarmine adhered to the following principle:
(Revelation) "Forcertain propositions p, includingpropositions about the heavens,believing pisprima facie justified if pisthe revealed word of God as claimed by the Bible." (Boghossian 2006,6 9) This interpretation can be supported by the fact that Bellarmine defended Ptolemy'ssystem with passages from the Bible: "The words 'The sun rises and the sun sets, and hurries back to whereitrises, etc.' werethose of Solomon, who not only spoke by divine inspiration but was am an wise abovea ll others" (Bellarmine 1615) .
But did Bellarmine use an epistemic system that can be categorized as agenuine alternative to our own?F or Boghossian this hingeso nw hether Bellarmine followed afundamental epistemic principle thatwedonot recognize as binding. The most plausible candidate for such fundamental principle is Revelation. Boghossianisnot convincedthatRevelation qualifies. If Revelation were fundamental then it would trump Observation with respect to some statements about the heavens (e. g. Jupiterh as moons) but not with respect to others (e. g. there are cloudsinthe sky).The problem is that the dividing line would not be epistemologicallymotivated; it would be arbitrary.And arbitrary distinctions make an ES incoherent.E rgoi ti sm ore charitable to assume that Revelation is derived; and that Bellarminea nd us share the samee pistemic system. Ia mn ot convinced. It is not obvious that if Revelation wereaf undamental principle for Bellarmine, he would then let Revelation trump Observation in an epistemicallyu nprincipled way. On the one hand, Bellarmine believed that no "true demonstration" of the Copernican system had been presented; and that therefored oubts about its truth werej ustified. On the other hand, he alsoh eld that "in ac aseo fd oubt,o ne mayn ot depart from the Scriptures as explained by the holyFathers" (Bellarmine1615). That is to say, the situations in which Rev-elation was the dominant principle with respect to the heavens wererestricted in aprincipled way. Revelation was to be relied upon when no true demonstration of as cientific theory was possible. We thus do not have to treat Revelation as a derivedp rinciple in order to save Bellarmine'se pistemic rationality. This is not to denyt hat the history of Bellarmine'sa doption of Revelation involved other principles to do with sensory observation or testimony. But this need not conflict with its fundamental status. Here it helps to think of epistemic systems as dynamic, and hence in accordance with On Certainty. InitiallyBellarmine maywell have justified Revelation in terms of norms and standards that he shared with Galileo and with us. But he mayt hen have gone further: he may have found further evidence for Revelation from readingt he Bible. Maybe the Bible told him to take Revelation as fundamental. This evidence mayh ave lead him to boost the standing of Revelation to ap osition as strongasa ny fundamental principle.
Remembera lso thatf or Bellarmine King Solomon "spoke by divinei nspiration".S om aybe Bellarmine accepted … (Mystical Perception): If it seems to Sthat God is telling him that p, and circumstantialconditions Do btain, then Si sprima facie justified in believingt hat God is tellingh im that p.
Trust in Mystical Perceptionm ay,o rm ay not have been based on the Bible. Either way, it could well have been fundamental.
Boghossian'ss econd example concerns exotic, real or imagined, tribes, like the oracle-using Azande or Wittgenstein's "odd woodsellers" that price piles of wood by the area covered, disregarding the height of the piles. Boghossian'scentral question is again whether we have here genuine alternative epistemic systems.H is treatment of the Azande'so racle is swift.E vent hough the Azande have an epistemic principle that they do not share with us -"(Oracle) Forcertain propositions p, believing pisprimafacie justified if aPoison Oracle says that p." (Boghossian2006,71) -this principle is not fundamental. If Oracle were fundamental thenthe Azande would let Observation be trumped in an arbitrary fashion (Boghossian 2006,105) . In the same context,B oghossian also addresses an old chestnut about the Azande'sreasoning.Recall that the Azandeaccept aprinciple accordingtowhich if afather is/was awitch, then so are his sons. And yet, confronted with, say, Jones, whose father was awitch, the Azandeare unwilling to draw the conclusion that Jones is awitch, too. Is this as ign thatt he Azande have adifferent logic?Dothey reject Modus Ponens?Boghossianjustifies anegative answer in the following way. Assume we translated some elements, E, of the Zandel anguagea s" if-then".A nd suppose further that on this translation the Azande would be committed to denying Modus Ponens. As Boghossian has it,this would be very strongevidence thatour translation of "E" as "if-then" had been incorrect.And he concludes that this demonstrates the difficulty of describing afundamentallydifferent logic, or agenuine alternative to our epistemic system. AllegedlyW ittgenstein conceded this point when he admitted that the odd woodsellers "simplyd on ot mean the same by 'al ot of wood' and 'al ittle wood' as we do […]" (RFM §150): "[…]t hey mayn ot be denying anything that we regarda so bviouslyt rue and the attempt to describe ag enuine alternative to our [ES] will have failed once again." (Boghossian 2006,109) What would Wittgenstein make of Boghossian'sa rguments?F irst of all, are the Azande arbitrary in lettingOracle trump Observation on some occasions but not on others?T his is farf rom obvious. They consultt heiro racles primarilyi n those areas of life wherei ti sh ard to obtain hard and fast evidence: adultery and causes of illness, mishaps and death.Why is this not ap lausible epistemic category?T urning to Boghossian'st ranslation-theoretic argument against the possibilityofadifferent logic, what if the best translation of the Azande'sexpression Ew eret he if-then of "relevance" or "linear logic"?O rw hat if on our translation at ribe'sl ogic were "paraconsistent" or "dialethist" or "defeasible"?O r what if the Azander estricted Modus Ponens to certain domains -on the basis of plausible epistemological considerations?W ould all these not count as different logics,leadingtodifferent conclusions?I tistrue that in such cases Ewould not mean "if-then" in the sense of the material conditional in classicallogic. But its meaning might stillbe"close enough" for us to see the similarities and to appreciatet he differences.
Finally, consider the odd woodsellers.I st heir system of measuring wood a genuine alternative to our own?W ittgenstein makes three observations on this imagined tribe. The first is that such tribe could easilyb ee xploited by us. Consider two piles of wood, Aa nd B, of identical area, but of different height: Bi s higher than A. Assumethat the Azandepossess Band we ownA.Wecould then say: "Let'ss wap: I'll give youm yP ile Bf or your Pile A." Second, Wittgenstein asks whether the odd woodsellers suffer from "logical madness".And third, Wittgenstein addresses the question whether the practice of the odd woodsellers is "pointless".Hereare his replies: "Pointless"?W ell, much is pointless in our culture, too. Think of coronations. Concerninglogical madness he writes: "We might call this akind of logical madness.But there is nothing wrongwith giving wood away.S ow hat is wrong with this?W em ight say, 'This is how they do it.'" (LFM 202) Andt hirdly, yes, the Azande are exploitableb yu s, but not by each other, provided they do not live by selling wood. And thus theirp ractice mayw ell be functional in their society.The upshot is thata lthough theirw ay of measuring the value of wood is very different from ours, theirs is not irrational. And thus Wittgenstein thinks thatt here is ap erspective from which the odd woodsellers' practice can be treated as equaltoour own -each is functional giventhe social arrangementsi nt he society.
Nevertheless,B oghossian'sw orry remains:d ot he Azande reallyd rawc onclusions that differ from ours?Ordothey simply mean different thingsby"little wood",and "alot of wood",and would we be in full agreement with them, once these differenceso nm eaningw erep roperlyt aken care of?I no ther words, is there anyd isagreement,o ra ny sort of exclusiveness, between us and them? One response to this might be to sayt hat the differences between us and the odd woodsellers must run much deeper than the simple distinction between two senses of "alot of wood" and "alittle of wood".Acommunity whose thinking differs from our with respect to these terms is also likelytodeviate from us in manyo ther respects. We do not simplyd isagree over whether pile Ai salittle wood or lots of wood; rather,the consequences of their perspective include actions thata re incompatible with the actions thata re consequences of the our perspective.O nt his line of reasoning Wittgenstein would replyt oB oghossian: 'youa re right,t he Odd Woodsellers do mean different thingsb y" al ot of wood" and "al ittle wood",b ut this does not removet he tension between their judgmentsa nd actions and ours.'
Another response -less Wittgensteinian -might be to insist thatBoghossian'sdistinguishing between two meanings of say "alot of wood" does not getrid of the disagreement.Assume we say(I) '(Pile) Aisalittle wood' and the Azande say(II) 'Aisalot of wood.' That surely looks like adisagreement.But if we mean different thingsb y' little wood' and 'al ot of wood',t he disagreement seems to disappear.( I) might then turn out to mean (I') "If one goes by area covered, Ai salittle wood",a nd (II) might become (II') "If one goes by the number of logs, Ai sal ot of wood." And yet, does this reallyr emovet he tension?N elson Goodman (Goodman 1978,114 -115) suggests that the answer must be negative: in replacing( I) with (I')a nd (II) with (II')w eh aves tripped away the speakers' commitments to claims about an amount of wood. And we have replaced these commitments with commitments about conditionals. To put the commitment backin, we have to add "and this is the correct way" to (I')and (II')respectively. Andt hen disagreementi sb ack.
6C onclusions
Ih avet ried to make plausible the following claims: §608 -612d on ot speaki n favour of MAR; On Certainty introduces various relativistic themes: Relativism of Distance; antirelativism as the naturalattitude in the case of certain challenges to current science; and Particularist Relativism. Boghossian and Wittgenstein conceptualize epistemic systems in rather different ways.These differences find expression in their different views on threetest cases. In these cases Wittgensteinian challenges to Boghossians eem promising.
